We show that an auctioneer may prefer to restrict entry by exacting an admission fee to having an extra potential bidder in an auction setting with endogenous bidder entry. We also highlight that admission fees and reserve prices are different instruments in a setting with uncertainty over entry costs, and that optimal mechanisms in such settings may be higher-dimensional than in Myerson (1981). Our results provide a counterpoint to the broad intuition of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) that market thickness often takes precedence over market power in auction design.
Introduction
Many real-world auctions impose nontrivial admission fees. BidPal, an online fundraising platform for non-profit organizations, advises charity auctioneers to charge for admission to their auctions; these fees brought in over $34.7 million in ticketing proceeds, averaging $55,000 per BidPal client in 2015. Meanwhile, Barret Jackson, a car auction house, charges a $200-$500 registration fee, which certainly exceeds the cost of administrative logistics.
Sotheby's, an art auction house, occasionally hosts sales events that require paid tickets.
Potential bidders to the aforementioned auctions must pay upfront-they tend not to know the exact characteristics of the objects being sold until after paying the admission fees.
The presence of admission fees is somewhat puzzling: Admission fees implicitly restrict entry, yet a now-standard intuition in auction market design suggests that auctioneers want to encourage as much participation as possible, in order to increase revenue by taking advantage of competition amongst bidders. Moreover, the benefit of increasing participation is known to outweigh the benefit of exercising market power through optimal reserve prices (Bulow and Klemperer (1996) ).
According to the intuition, the preference for market thickness-increasing the number of auction participants-should take precedence over any preference for market power-designing auction mechanisms specifically favorable to the auctioneer. Yet admission fees are a design tool which exercises market power precisely by limiting thickness.
In this paper, we rationalize the presence of admission fees by observing that if entry is endogenous, then the scope of the auctioneer's market power expands-and, consequently, admission fees are sometimes more effective at raising revenue than reserve prices are. Indeed, setting admission fees enables auctioneers to extract revenue before potential bidders learn their full valuations and acquire private information that affects their willingness to pay; when the valuation distribution has a long upper tail, this extracts far more revenue upfront than do mechanisms like reserve prices that screen participation once values are known.
We work with an independent, symmetric private values setting with endogenous entry and uncertainty over bidders' private entry costs. We find that auctioneers may prefer a second-price auction with few potential bidders and an admission fee to one with more potential bidders and no admission fee. We enumerate a few extreme cases, in which the optimal admission fees are almost prohibitive. We also provide a limited characterization of optimal mechanisms in the endogenous entry setting, extending McAfee and McMillan (1987) to a stochastic entry cost model.
Our main contribution is twofold. First, we investigate the thickness-market power tradeoff in an endogenous setting that closely resembles that of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) ; we show that accounting for entry can tip the balance in favor of market power. Second, we develop a framework in which bidders' entry costs are stochastic to the auctioneer, generalizing previous work by McAfee and McMillan (1987) , Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993) , and Moreno and Wooders (2011).
Related literature
We are not the first to investigate the tradeoff between market thickness and market power in auctions. Bulow and Klemperer (1996) provides a benchmark in favor of thickness: At the auction stage, gaining an extra bidder is more valuable in expectation than switching to the optimal mechanism (assuming symmetric bidders). To our knowledge, we are the first to investigate thickness-market power tradeoff in an endogenous-entry setting that is similar to Bulow and Klemperer (1996) . However, other works have already noted that the tradeoff may be different once entry is endogenous. McAfee and McMillan (1987) analyze a setting with ex ante identical potential bidders; they note that it is optimal for the auctioneer to set an admission fee, noting the efficacy of admission fees as an instrument of market power. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993) notes that the auctioneer at most wants to subsidize the entry of a single extra bidder, showing that market thickness has limited allure. Harstad (1990) and Mares and Harstad (2003) study endogenous entry in common-value auctions and also question the intuition that the auctioneer should expend resources to thicken the market.
Moreno and Wooders (2011) also consider admission fees in an endogenous entry settingand reach similar conclusions on the optimality of admission fees-in a model with fixed, heterogeneous entry costs and a simultaneous entry equilibrium. Our work differs from and extends Moreno and Wooders (2011) in at least three ways. First, we consider a broader entry cost model where entry costs are allowed to be stochastic to the auctioneer. Second, we consider a stricter entry equilibrium, à la Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993) , where the entry decision is rational both prior to entry and after entry. Third, we use the optimality of admission fees to directly respond to the intuition of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) .
Paper organization The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model and equilibrium concept. Section 3 presents our main results, showing sufficient conditions under which auctioneers prefer smaller auctions with admission-fees to larger auctions with open entry, and demonstrating an explicit example. Section 4 shows that if bidders' value-discovery costs are known to the auctioneer-a special case of the main model-then there may be pathological circumstances in which the optimal admission fee is prohibitive. Section 5 briefly discusses optimal mechanisms under endogenous entry. Section 6 concludes.
Model
There is an auctioneer, who holds a single, indivisible object and faces an exogenous set I = {1, . . . , N } of potential bidders. All agents are risk-neutral. The object has value 0 to the auctioneer.
The auction proceeds in three stages:
1. First, the auctioneer selects an auction mechanism A and sets an admission fee φ.
Neither A nor φ is discriminatory-that is, φ does not differ across bidders and the auction's allocation and payment rules can depend only upon the values of the submitted bids. Both A and φ are public and known to the potential bidders.
2. Next, each potential bidder i ∈ I chooses whether to enter the auction. All potential bidders i who enter pay the admission fee φ to the auctioneer, and also incur a private entry cost c i , which represents the investment required to participate in the auction and evaluate the object.
1 The entry costs c i are drawn from a joint distribution C,
2 Each c i is private to i, but the distribution C is public.
3. Finally, the potential bidders i who chose to enter learn their valuations v i and the auctioneer runs the auction format A. 3 We primarily consider a symmetric, independent private value setting, in which the valuations v i are drawn independently from a distribution F , supported on [0, ∞) with increasing virtual valuation ψ( Myerson (1981) ). The valuations are private to the bidders, but the distribution F is common knowledge at the start of the game.
Bidder i's payoff is where m i is the payment i makes to the auctioneer (which may depend upon auction format).
1 In our setting, entry costs and the admission fees are incurred simultaneously. This simplification is realistic in common charity auction settings, in which either bidders can only inspect objects onsite, or bidders pay a registration fee and receive a catalogue of items being auctioned.
2 We require that
, for any permutation σ : I → I, so as to rationalize the non-discriminatory admission fee φ. If instead the entry costs are known and the auctioneer can set discriminatory admission fees, the auctioneer can set fees so as to extract all of the social surplus (see Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993) ; Hatfield et al. (2016) ).
3 Our value-discovery timing, while agreeing with much of the endogenous entry literature, is different from that of Menezes and Monteiro (2000) , who analyze a setting in which potential bidders know their private values before entering the auction. We note that in the Menezes and Monteiro (2000) setting each bidder has a cutoff strategy: A bidder enters when c i < c * (v i ); hence, the Menezes and Monteiro (2000) mechachanism can be reinterpreted as an exogenous-entry auction with a special allocation and payment rule. Thus translated, the Menezes and Monteiro (2000) setting corresponds to an auction in which reserve prices can vary across bidders (and are set at c * (v i )); this then lends itself to analysis using the Myerson (1981) revenue equivalence theorem.
Entry Equilibrium
We note that under our assumption that the value distribution v i is independently and identically distributed, the probability of winning the auction is equal across bidders ex ante. Therefore, the (expected) gross payoff to entering the auction only depends on the number of auction participants-and not on their individual identities.
Thus, we may let V n (A) denote the (expected) gross payoff to being in an auction with n bidders. For each agent i, we have
whenever n potential bidders enter.
We now describe how the value of n is determined in equilibrium.
Definition 1.
Given N, c, φ, A, an entry quasi-equilibrium is a set entering of bidders B with
Definition 1, equivalent to the Entry Assumption of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993) , is appealing, as it means that no potential bidder regrets his or her entry decision (both before and after the set of bidders is revealed). However, Definition 1 is still not quite strong enough for our analysis, in the following sense: Prior to entry, the potential bidders vary only on the dimension of c i . If c i < c j , then i has a higher propensity to enter the auction than j, so to speak, as i values an auction seat more than j does. However, it is possible for a quasi-equilibrium to include j but not i. An equilibrium in which j enters but i does not is nonrobust, in some sense, as (1) i could pay j to swap positions, or (2) the auctioneer could increase φ so that j drops out and i enters; we correct this irregularity by strengthening the quasi-equilibrium concept.
Definition 2. Given N, c, φ, A, an entry equilibrium is a quasi-equilibrium B (with size |B|)
such that c i < c j for all i ∈ B and j ∈ B.
Note that an entry equilibrium always exists. Indeed, we may sort the potential bidders by increasing entry cost c i , and then construct an entry equilibrium by sequentially asking the potential bidders whether they wish to join the auction and stopping at the first potential bidder who declines. If the rewards to entering E[V n (A)] are non-increasing in n, then there is a unique equilibrium size n, and moreover, the profiles of entrants' costs are identical across equilibria. Finally, if no c i and c j are equal, then there is a unique equilibrium set of bidders.
We summarize these existence and uniqueness results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Given N, c, A, φ:
1. An entry equilibrium exists.
If E[V n (A)] is non-increasing in n, then all (quasi-)equilibria have the same size.

If c i = c j for all i, j and if E[V n (A)] is non-increasing in n, then there is a unique (quasi-)equilibrium.
In our setting, the equilibrium number of bidders is not stochastic conditional on the entry cost profile c. (The number of bidders is still stochastic to the auctioneer because of her uncertainty over c ∼ C.) Thus, our setting is markedly different from those of Levin and Smith (1994) and Moreno and Wooders (2011) , which assume that potential bidders make simultaneous decisions to enter the auction, and requires those decisions to be rational ex ante-but not necessarily rational ex post. Our setting is plausible when bidders can signal tentative entry decisions, perhaps through some pre-registration process or by contacting the auctioneer to learn information about the auction, thereby selecting a set of bidders that prevents ex post regret. When entry costs are fixed and symmetric, our equilibrium setting is equivalent to that of McAfee and McMillan (1987) , whereas the equilibrium concept of Levin and Smith (1994) and Moreno and Wooders (2011) may not be.
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We now require E[V n (A)] to be non-increasing in n, so that equilibrium size is unique. The assumption simply means that potential bidders dislike competition, and are more inclined to enter if the number of bidders is small.
Main Results
Our framework is similar to that of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) -and like Bulow and Klemperer (1996) , we seek to examine a tradeoff between market thickness and market power. Just as Bulow and Klemperer (1996) interprets market thickness as one extra bidder and market power as the ability to set reserve prices, we interpret market thickness as one extra potential bidder and market power as the ability to set positive admission fees. Our main result shows that, in our setting with endogenous entry, the answer to the market thickness-market power tradeoff is less clean-cut than in the Bulow and Klemperer (1996) setting.
Crucially, the key difference between our model and that of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) is that, in our model, the auctioneer wields market power at the entry stage. Before entering, potential bidders do not know their valuations for the object at sale. Once a bidder enters the auction, she learns her valuation of the object and can thus calibrate her action according to her willingness to pay. Admission fees charges bidders up front, preventing them from taking advantage of their private valuations. 5 (For example, if there is only one potential bidder, then the auctioneer charges an admission fee equal to the bidder's expected valuation, giving the bidder an expected payoff of zero; however, once the bidder learns her valuation, any transaction will involve that bidder receiving some surplus.) Thus, admission fees are a powerful instrument for the auctioneer, and our main result shows that their value may 4 To wit, note that the setting of McAfee and McMillan (1987) has a nonstochastic number of bidders; this is also true in our setting if auctioneer has no uncertainty over the profile of entry costs {c 1 , . . . , c N } (by Proposition 1). In the setting of Moreno and Wooders (2011), each potential bidder has a mixed entry strategy, and the number of bidders is thus stochastic.
5 In contrast, post-entry mechanisms like reserve prices afford no such advantages.
sometimes dominate that of extra competition at the auction stage.
In this section, we restrict the auction format A to a second-price auction with no reserve price, so as to simplify our analysis. We present a partial analysis of more general mechanisms in Section 5.
Preliminaries
We introduce a few shorthands to simplify notation.
Note that, when A is a second-price auction, we have V n (A) ∼ V n . We first show a useful result regarding the relationships of the expectations of M n , S n , and V n .
Lemma 1.
We have the following probability identities:
Sufficient Conditions for Exercising Market Power through Admission Fees
Our main result shows reasonably common sufficient conditions under which the revenuemaximizing auctioneer would prefer to set admission fees than to induce an extra potential bidder to enter. Note that, entry restriction is twofold in this case: Not only does the auctioneer prefer market power to a thicker market, but the market power she desires is precisely the power to profit from thinning the market. To prove Theorem 1, we choose a fee equal to φ = E(V N −1 − V N ), which ensures that at least N − 1 potential bidders enter the auction in equilibrium. If exactly N − 1 bidders enter the auction, the revenue is
by Lemma 1, which means that, in the worst case for the auctioneer, the increased revenue due to the admission fee exactly offsets the fee's adverse effects on demand. Thus, the fee produces a surplus over E[S N ] of size
A thicker market, on the other hand, produces a
This gives rise to Condition (1). Note that, since Condition (1) is derived from calculating revenue by choosing a specific fee, it is only a sufficient condition.
By employing the same strategy, this time choosing a price φ = E(V N − V N +1 ), we can prove a similar result. 
If we are willing to assume that the entry costs are even smaller with probability 1, then we obtain much simpler conditions in Corollary 1 and Theorem 2. If, in addition, the entry costs are identical and nonstochastic à la McAfee and McMillan (1987) , the auctioneer can then set an admission fee to extract the entire social surplus-a special case of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993)-and Corollary 2 shows that market power is often preferable to market thickness.
Note that the conclusions of Theorems 1 and 2 ought not to be surprising a priori. In our setting, we can view the auctioneer as a monopolist selling seats to the auction and facing a stochastic demand curve, receiving a subsidy of E[S n ] if she sells seats to n people. The choice presented to the auctioneer is akin to choosing between her price-setting power and an upward shift in the demand curve, and it is certainly plausible that there exists conditions under which the auctioneer prefers the former. The assumption that costs are relatively small is akin to assuming an inelastic demand curve, which means that the monopolist's payoff from setting high prices is high.
Moreover, admission fees are, in some sense, more powerful revenue collection instruments for the auctioneer, as they allow the auctioneer to charge prices in expectation, thereby preventing bidders from taking advantage of information about their values. Indeed, consider the example in Bulow and Klemperer (1996) , where the auctioneer faces one single bidder whose valuation is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. In the setting of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) , the auctioneer can do no better than setting a reserve price of . In our setting, however, the auctioneer can set an admission fee of 1 2
and give the object to the bidder for free. By setting a fee in advance, she prevents the bidder from gaining and benefitting from private information, collecting
. This idea underpins Corollary 2 (as well as Theorem 4, which we present later).
An Explicit Example
We suppose that c i 
are the order statistics and
Then (1) becomes
We take the logarithm of (2) and rearrange to obtain
By the inequality x 1+x
≤ log(1 + x) ≤ x, we derive the bounds
a sufficient condition for (2) is then
Although (1) is certainly not a necessary condition, we nevertheless confirm that some additional structure is needed in order to make admission fees optimal-the auctioneer sometimes does prefer a larger pool of potential bidders. We consider the case N = 2 in our example setting, in which E[V 1 ] = 2 and E[V 2 ] = 1. If φ > 1, then the entry is never individually rational for two bidders, and the auctioneer collects P (c 1 < 2−φ or c 2 < 2−φ)φ =
(1−(1−2+φ) 2 )φ = (1−(φ−1) 2 )φ. If φ ≤ 1, then the auction is always individually rational for at least one bidder; P (two bidders enter) = (1 − φ) 2 and P (one bidder enters) = 1
Thus, the expected revenue in the auction with two potential bidders is
yielding optimal revenue 32 27
and optimal fee φ = . When three bidders enter, by contrast, 7 We may check numerically that (2) holds for N = 5 as well. thus, the auctioneer does indeed prefer an auction with three potential bidders and no fee to an auction with two potential bidders and an admission fee.
Known Entry Costs and Extreme Cases
As a special case, we can simplify the analysis by assuming away the auctioneer's uncertainty over entry costs. Formally, we suppose that C is a random distribution over permutations of {c (1) , . . . , c (N ) } so that the auctioneer knows the exact empirical distribution of entry costs, but is still unable to set discriminatory fees. In this case, entry costs are no longer independently and identically distributed as in Section 3, so we have to modify our framework slightly in order to compare our results to Bulow and Klemperer (1996) . In particular, we may assume that the (N + 1)-st potential bidder has cost c N +1 = 0, so as to be as favorable as possible to having a thicker market. We find nevertheless that there are conditions under which the auctioneer may prefer to set an admission fee so prohibitive that only one potential bidder enters in equilibrium. McAfee and McMillan (1987) observed that if the cost of entry is large enough-and the same for every potential bidder-then the optimal number of bidders for the auctioneer may be 1, as reducing entry may increase the remaining potential bidders' willingness to pay to enter. Here, we find a similar insight, extending McAfee and McMillan (1987) by dropping the symmetric entry cost restriction and explicitly comparing our result to that of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) . (1) , . . . , c (N ) } such that, when C is a random distribution over permutations of {c (1) , . . . , c (N ) },
Theorem 3. For any N , there exists an F and (nonstochastic) {c
is increasing in x.
If there are no admission fees, every bidder enters in equilibrium-yet under the optimal
admissions fee for the auctioneer, only 1 bidder enters in equilibrium.
3. The auctioneer prefers to be able to set an admission fee and have only N potential bidders than to have N + 1 potential bidders but no opportunity to set an admission fee.
The first conclusion in Theorem 3 verifies that the distribution F satisfies the decreasingmarginal-revenue regularity condition of Myerson (1981), Bulow and Roberts (1989) , and Bulow and Klemperer (1996) . The second conclusion is similar to the McAfee and McMillan (1987) observation that the optimal number of bidders is sometimes 1. The third conclusion, similar to results in Section 3, shows that the auctioneer prefers market power to market thickness in a setting with endogenous entry.
The intuition here is that, conditional on the number of entrants n, the auctioneer should set φ so that one of the entrants has expected utility 0. In this case, revenue is
by Lemma 1. The gain to restricting entry is
In order to make R(n − 1) − R(n) positive everywhere, we need to construct rapidly increasing entry costs such that max j∈Bn {c j } − max j∈B n−1 {c j } are large. But in order to keep the auction without admission fee individually rational for all N bidders, E[V n ] needs to decline slowly. In the proof of Theorem 3, we choose v ∼ Pareto(1/λ), with λ < 1, in which case
Notably, the distribution Pareto(1/λ) has the property that E[S n ] < 2 n for any λ but
, which is larger for λ sufficiently close to 1. This means that the information advantage the bidder accrues after entry, described in Section 1, may be extremely large.
The auctioneer can thus do much better by charging each bidder prior to entry; capitalizing on this observation, we can demonstrate that the auctioneer may prefer an upfront sale to 1 potential bidder to a second-price auction auction with N potential bidders even in a stochastic entry cost model.
Theorem 4. For any N and cost distribution C, there exists a value distribution F with
increasing virtual valuation such that the auctioneer prefers an "auction" with 1 potential bidder and an optimal admissions fee-essentially, an upfront sale at the ex ante optimal price-to having N potential bidders but no opportunity to set an admission fee.
The intuition behind Theorem 4 is that if the value distribution has a long upper-tail, then the auctioneer can set a high admission fee and profit substantially in the event that a single bidder decides to enter. As an empirical speculation, this would mean that auctioneers whose goods may be extremely valuable (e.g., art or antique auctioneers), should often set nearly prohibitive admission fees or arrange private sales.
Towards Optimal Mechanisms
Our analysis so far has constrained the auctioneer to use a second-price auction; the auctioneer's only possible instrument of market power has been the ability to set an admission fee. We restricted our attention to second-price auctions to make the analysis tractable-but in general, the auctioneer's optimal mechanism does not use admission fees alone. In this section, we lay some groundwork for exploring optimal mechanisms with endogenous entry and uncertainty over entry costs. McAfee and McMillan (1987) show that in a setting where entry costs are symmetric, nonstochastic, and known, the optimal auction is one with nonnegative admission fee and no reserve price. The McAfee and McMillan (1987) result extends to the heterogeneous entry cost setting of Moreno and Wooders (2011); we show that it continues to hold, with unchanged intuition, in an asymmetric, nonstochastic cost environment with our equilibrium concept.
8 Indeed, conditional on the number of potential bidders n, we may transform any mechanism into a second-price auction with no reserve price and positive admission fee, so that the number of bidders remain unchanged-yet the social welfare may (weakly) increase, as the original mechanism might be inefficient. Increasing social welfare can then fund an increase in the auctioneer's revenue. We summarize the result in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. If the cost profile {c (1) , . . . , c (n) } is known to the auctioneer, then the optimal auction mechanism is a second-price auction with positive admission fee and no reserve prices. Note that Proposition 2 does depend on the auctioneer having certainty on the profile of entry costs, thus having certainty on the number of bidders entering the action. In the general setting with stochastic cost profiles, given an admission fee, the number of bidders entering the auction, n, is stochastic. The deterrence effect of an admission fee is fixed for each realization of n. Reserve prices, by contrast, are flexible in n-they deter participation in the auction more when n is small and less when n is large, and this flexibility can be 8 Moreno and Wooders (2011) prove the analogous result using a simultaneous entry equilibrium concept.
extremely valuable when n is uncertain. We illustrate the difference of reserve prices and admission fees as revenue-raising instruments with a numerical simulation: Suppose that
∼ Unif with n = 3 bidders. We plot in Figure 1 estimations 9 of the auctioneer's expected revenue against the admissions fee set, for reserve prices 0 and 0.5. It is evident that a combination of reserve price and admission fee strictly dominates admission fee alone in terms of revenue.
Discussion and Conclusion
The tradeoff between market thickness and market power establishes the relative priorities of thickening a market and designing optimal mechanisms-both important considerations in auction market design. We know from Bulow and Klemperer (1996) that, when entry is exogenous, the value of increasing market thickness dominates that of establishing market power via Myerson reserve prices. In a setting with endogenous entry, however, we find a counterpoint: As our Theorem 1 shows, the auctioneer might prefer to extract surplus upfront even though doing so might cost entry. We hope that our observation helps rationalize the presence of admission fees and other entry restrictions in real-world auction designs.
We highlight, moreover, that admission fees and reserve prices serve different purposes.
Admission fees effectively extract surplus prior to entry-thus preventing bidders from taking advantage of private valuations. Reserve prices, on the other hand, serve as a hedge against market thinness, as they guarantee the auctioneer surplus when only a few bidders are present. In Section 5, we show that without uncertainty over entry costs, admission fees are an instrument superior to reserve prices. However, in the presence of uncertainty, we show by example that the two instruments may work as complements. Our analysis of optimal 9 We perform the simulations as follows. We sample the bidder cost profiles 5 × 10 4 times and estimate E [revenue|c] for each cost profile c. The expected revenue for each (φ, r) combination is then computed by averaging over E [revenue|c] for each c. To compute E[revenue|c], we compute the expected profitability of participating in an auction with n bidders and the associated seller revenue, by averaging over 10 5 simulations for each n. We then compute the equilibrium n for each realization of c and use the associated revenue as an estimate for E [revenue|c] . mechanisms in auctions with endogenous entry is decidedly partial, and we hope that future work, whether theoretical or numerical (as in Dütting et al. (2017) We claim that the resulting set B * = B n is an equilibrium. Termination of the construction
10 Thus, we see that B * is an equilibrium.
Second claim. We let B and B be quasi-equilibria, and suppose that |B| > |B | (without loss of generality).
contradicting B being a quasi-equilibrium. Thus |B| = |B |.
Third claim. Without loss of generality, we let B 1 and B 2 be two equilibria such that i ∈ B 1 but i ∈ B 2 . Suppose c i is the m-th smallest of the costs c j . Then
contradicting B 2 being an equilibrium.
B Proof of Lemma 1
First claim. We consider v 1 , . . . , v n
∼ F . There are n subsets of {v 1 , . . . , v n } of size n − 1.
proving the first claim.
C Proof of Theorem 1
The auction with N + 1 potential bidders and no admissions fee yield expected revenue
Suppose the auctioneer sets a fee equal to 
(Claim 3 of Lemma 1)
Thus a sufficient condition for
by Lemma 1, which rearranges to Condition (1).
D Proof of Corollary 1
Under the hypotheses of Corollary 1, we can simplify (1) to
E Proof of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2
Here
Corollary 2 is immediate from Theorem 2. Note also that in the setting of Corollary 2, the auctioneer can extract all of the social surplus (Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993) and Hatfield et al. (2016) ).
F Proof of Theorem 3
For some λ < 1, let F ∼ Pareto(1/λ) ∼ exp(λX) where X ∼ Expo. The proof selects a λ that satisfies the conclusions.
First claim
Note that, for all λ < 1,
is increasing in x. 
Third claim
The expectation of (3) is
Thus, the auction with N + 1 potential bidders without an admission fee delivers at most 2 N in expected revenue. Thus, so long as λ > 1 − 2 −N , so that which implies that
Now, define a sequence c n such that c 1 = 0 and
We show that there exists a λ such that Define
Note that if λ = 1, then κ n−1 = · · · = κ 0 = 1. By continuity of κ n−1 in λ, there exists a δ
To finish the proof, pick λ > max(1 − 2 −N , 1 − δ) to ensure the third claim holds. Let n ≥ 0 be an increasing sequence such that 1 = 0 and = − n − (n − 1)( n − n−1 ) < 0, by construction of c n . Thus the optimal revenue constrained on there being n bidders is decreasing in n. Thus the optimal auction for the auctioneer has size 1.
G Proof of Theorem 4
Take F ∼ Pareto(1/λ) as in the proof of Theorem 3. The expected revenue of the auction with N potential bidders is bounded by 2 N −1 by Appendix F. Choose > 0 so that P (c 1 ≤ ) > 0
Setting an admissions fee of 
H Proof of Proposition 2
Fix some auction format and admission fee (A 0 , φ 0 ) , we shall show that there exists φ such that (A, φ), where A is the second-price auction with no reserve prices, delivers weakly more revenue. 
